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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the dramatic increases in rice output and productivity in Vietnam due in large 
part to market reform, inducing farmers to work harder and use land more efficiently. The reform 
process is captured through changes in effort variables and a decomposition of total factor 
productivity (TFP) for Vietnam as a whole as well as for the north and south of the country taken 
separately. The results show that the more extensive is market reform the larger the increase in 
TFP and the share of TFP growth due to incentive effects, suggesting that more competitive 
markets and secure property rights matter greatly. 
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the dramatic increases in rice output and productiv-
ity in Vietnam due in large part to market reform, inducing farmers to work
harder and use land more eﬃciently. The reform process is captured through
changes in eﬀort variables and a decomposition of total factor productivity
(TFP) for Vietnam as a whole as well as for the north and south of the
country taken separately. The results show that the more extensive is mar-
ket reform the larger the increase in TFP and the share of TFP growth due
to incentive eﬀects, suggesting that more competitive markets and secure
property rights matter greatly.
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1. Introduction
Since the beginning of its ‘doi moi’ market reform process in 1981, Vietnam
has achieved remarkable success in increasing the output of rice and other food
products. From being a large importer of these products through the early 1980’s,
Vietnam has now become the second largest exporter of rice in the world, with
the total output of all agricultural products more than doubling during the main
period of reform from 1981 to 1994.
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Even more notable is the fact that these
gains have been achieved with a relatively modest growth of most inputs and
with limited technological change, suggesting an impressive rate of growth of
total factor productivity in agriculture due in large part to reform measures.
The market reform process in Vietnamese agriculture over this period has
been pervasive, including a signiﬁcant liberalization of internal and external trade,
greater autonomy for farmers in decision making and fundamental institutional
change including the reform of the property rights regime. It is the contention of
this paper that such far-reaching changes have considerably enhanced incentives
for farmers to work hard and to use land more eﬃciently. A simple model is
used to estimate the importance of these incentive eﬀects in explaining the large
increases in rice output and productivity which were observed from 1981 to 1994.
As a whole the results are striking. Total factor productivity (TFP), which
was declining at a rate of 2.4 per cent per annum in the north prior to the reforms,
increased by almost 2 per cent per annum in the initial reform stage (1981-87) and
by more than 3 per cent per annum in the later stage of reforms (1988-94). In the
south, with a more recent memory of market institutions, the results were more
immediate: TFP, growing at 2.3 per cent per annum prior to the reforms, grew at
4.8 per cent per annum for the initial years of reform, tapering oﬀ to a rate of 2.8
per cent per annum in the later years. In both the north and south growth due
to the incentive component of TFP accelerated as reform proceeded, accounting
for roughly 20 per cent of cumulative TFP growth in the early years of reform
(relative to the communal regime, or prior to ‘doi moi’) and rising to about 60
per cent in the later years. Thus, the more extensive the degree of market reform
the larger the eﬀects on rice output and productivity, suggesting that incentives,
more competitive markets and secure property rights matter greatly.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
market reform process in Vietnam. Section 3 presents the basic model which will
be used to explain the eﬀects of market reform on rice output and productivity.
The model captures market reform measures through policy induced changes in
TFP and a decomposition of TFP into productivity changes due to enhanced
incentive eﬀects from those due to other ‘unexplained’ factors.
3
In Section 4 the
parameters of the underlying production function are estimated using a provincial
level panel data set for the years 1991 to 1994. Resulting measures of TFP
with market reform are derived over more aggregated data and then used in
Section 5 to estimate the contribution of incentive eﬀects to productivity growth
over the reform period. Any potential technological change remains (as usual)
1
The output of rice itself increased from 12,415 in 1981 to 23,528 thousand tons in 1994
(GSO, 1995).
2
Pingali and Xuan (1992) is an early and related work shows a signiﬁcant negative impact of
collectivization on productivity and rice production.
3
Che, Kompas and Vousden (2001) extend the static model to the case of an intertemporal
economy where incentive eﬀects result in induced capital formation and both larger transitional
growth rates and steady state values for rice output.
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as a residual. The focus is on the years 1981 to 1994 for two simple reasons:
ﬁrst, this is the most comprehensive data set available (and especially so with
regard to measures of tractors as buﬀalo equivalents and fertilizer, including night
soil); and second, these years cover the two main periods of market reform in
Vietnam.
4
Section 6 concludes. Appendix A indicates all data sources and the
various methods used to construct speciﬁc variables in the data set and appendix
B collects technical details.
2. Background
With roughly 80 per cent of the population living in rural areas in 1994 (GSO,
1995), the agricultural sector in Vietnam, accounting for 50 per cent of material
or non-service output and at least 30 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
provided employment for 72 per cent of the total labour force (GSO, 1995). Cul-
tivated agriculture was predominant, at 74 per cent of gross agricultural output
(GSO, 1995), especially rice production which constituted about 90 per cent of
the output of food grains.
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Given diﬀerent natural conditions and prior political regimes, rice growing
regions in Vietnam are designated in this paper as being in the ‘north’ and ‘south’
of the country. The north includes the provinces of the North East and North
West, the Red River Delta and the North Central Coast. Of these, the Red
River Delta is the principal agricultural region which roughly surrounds Hanoi.
The south includes the Central Highlands, the South Central Coast, the North
East and the Cuu Long (Mekong) River Delta. The country is naturally suited
for rice production, especially for so-called ‘wet rice’ production. Located in a
tropical area with high humidity, Vietnam beneﬁts from an advantageous water
system, with an extensive network of rivers, favorable topography and rain fall
patterns. Although humid and tropical weather is predominant overall, there are
still some diﬀerences between north and south. The monsoon inﬂuences the north
with four diﬀerent seasons, spring (March to April), summer (May to August),
autumn (September to October) and winter (November to February), and the
rainy season dominates the weather in the south with two seasons, the wet (June
to November) and the dry season (December to May). Periods of ﬂood and
drought are the main sources of seasonal variation in rice output.
The relevant transitional periods that correspond to the available data can be
divided into the communal system (1975—80), used as a base comparison through-
out, and two principal market reform periods designated by: (a) output contracts
4
Given that the second and more extensive market reforms introduced in 1988-94 have con-
tinued since, rice output in Vietnam has continued to increase dramatically to 31,394 thousand
tons in 1999, or 33 per cent more rice output than in 1994 (SDAFF, 2001).
5
Little has changed since 1994. At present, 80 per cent of the population still lives in rural
areas and rice production accounts for roughly 92 per cent of the output of food grains (SDAFF,
2001).
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(1981—87) and (b) trade liberalization (1988—94).
6
The overall process is char-
acterized by a move from public ownership and central planning to a form of
private property and more competitive markets, with enhanced incentives to pro-
duce more and more eﬃciently.
In broad terms, under the communal system, virtually all of rice production
was located in compulsory agricultural collectives, with all farm activities, includ-
ing the choice of inputs, designated by state-planning authorities. After harvest,
a portion of output was extracted by the central government. The remainder was
required by law to be sold entirely to the state at low state prices (roughly 20—30
percent of the estimated market price). Small private plots were allowed but only
for the household consumption of subsidiary agricultural goods, and since indi-
vidual eﬀort was hard to accurately determine the distribution of rice within the
commune was based on egalitarian criteria. As a apparent result of these controls
the output of rice fell markedly and especially so over the period 1977—80, forcing
Vietnam to import large amounts of rice, roughly 1.5 million tons or 13 percent of
total food requirements per year (GSO, 1995 and SDP, 1995), to meet domestic
demand.
The period of output contracts corresponds to a move to de-collectivize agri-
culture. Plots of land were allocated to prior members of the commune and
farmers were allowed to organize production activities privately, in what eﬀec-
tively was a tentative ﬁrst move towards private property rights. Although, for
the most part, rice was still required to be sold in state markets at low state
prices, private domestic markets (for some portion of output sold, roughly 20%)
inevitably emerged and were condoned by state authorities. In fact, the period is
generally characterized by a ‘dual price’ system (a low state price and a compet-
itive market price), albeit with strict controls to prevent arbitrage opportunities
between markets.
The period of trade liberalization ﬁnally allowed for eﬀective private property
rights over both land (initially 10—15 year leases) and capital equipment. Pro-
duction decisions were de-centralized, all farm income (after tax) was retained by
the farmer and in 1990 the central government abolished the dual price system.
Rice could now be sold on competitive domestic markets with an incentive struc-
ture that rewarded individual eﬀort. In 1993 tenure arrangements over land were
extended (to 20 year leases), provisions for the exchanging of leases and the sale
of land were introduced and farmers (through voluntary cooperatives) could now
sell rice freely in international markets.
Table 1 gives a useful overview of the performance of the Vietnamese rice
sector over this period in terms of the ﬁtted annual rates of growth of output
and inputs for the period as a whole and for each of the three stages considered
above. For the communal period (1976-80), the north experienced a contraction
in rice output of almost 4 per cent per annum, while output in the south grew
6
Fforde and de Vylder (1988) and Fforde (1996) is an expert discussion on the process and
rationale of transition in Vietnam in the 1980s.
4
at 3.4 per cent per annum, leading to almost no change for the country as a
whole during this period.
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In contrast, in the ﬁrst stage of reforms (1980-87),
output grew by almost 5 per cent per annum in the south and 3.8 per cent per
annum in the north (4.2 per cent for the country as a whole). In the second,
trade liberalization stage of reform, output growth accelerated to 6.5 per cent
annum in the south, 5.6 per cent per annum in the north and 6.1 per cent for
the country as a whole. In short, output growth was higher in the second stage
of reforms in both the north and the south, although the growth rates in the
south were higher than those in the north for the whole period 1976-94. This
diﬀerential performance was particularly marked in the investment response of
the two regions: in the latter stage of reforms, capital increased by 14.5 per
cent per annum in the south compared to only 6.8 per cent per annum in the
north. Apart from this accelerated capital growth in the period 1988-94, there
was relatively little growth in measured factor inputs. Indeed, labour and land
inputs into rice production were virtually unchanged over the full period 1980-94
with the sown area of land contracting slightly in each stage of reform. This
suggests the presence of signiﬁcant growth in total factor productivity. In the
following section, a simple model is developed to measure TFP growth in the
Vietnamese rice sector and to estimate the contribution of incentive eﬀects to
that growth.
3. Model
3.1. The technical production function
The model of the eﬀects of market reform on agricultural output is based on the
seminal approach developed by McMillan, Whalley and Zhu (1989) to analyze
Chinese agriculture, extended to account for the nature of rice production and
the various market reform measures introduced in Vietnam. Let ε
n
represent
the level of eﬀort of a typical farmer so that for N workers ε
n
N is the eﬀective
contribution of labour to output measured in ‘eﬃciency units’. As mentioned,
the value of ε
n
can be broadly interpreted to include everything that determines
the quality of the farmer’s labour as well as the willingness to literally exert more
7
The nature of agricultural cooperatives diﬀered substantially between the north and south
during the communal period (Chu, et al., 1992). In the north advanced cooperatives (with de-
tailed central plans and pooled land, labour and equipment) were dominant since 1975, covering
97 per cent of all farmers. Farmers in the south, who were familiar with the market economy,
were generally more reluctant to implement state-directed agricultural cooperatives after reuni-
ﬁcation. From 1976 to 1980, the ‘production cooperative’ (a primitive form of a cooperative,
with shared labour and equipment) was popular in the south and dominant in the Cuu Long
River delta. At the end of 1980 there were 1,518 cooperatives and 9,350 production cooperatives
in the south, including only 36 per cent of farmers (albeit with coverage of as many as 90 per
cent of farmers in the central regions of the south). Nevertheless, diﬀerences in cooperatives
aside, all output in both the north and south had to be sold to the state at low state prices
during this period.
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eﬀort due to the enhanced incentives that accompany market reform and the
removal of externally imposed restrictions on the kinds of tasks a farmer may
undertake.
With security over land tenure and the freedom to manage farm production,
the typical farmer may be expected to manage land-use in a way which increases
the productivity of a given area. To capture this eﬀect let L represent total sown
area and let ε
l
capture the eﬀort associated with exploiting and managing the
land. Optimal land use may involve eﬀort directed towards increasing the number
of crops sown in a given area or simply the planning involved in increasing the
yield on a given amount of land. With reform, for example, it was common in
Vietnam to initiate multiple cropping of rice and certainly so relative to produc-
tion plans in the communal period. The total input of land measured in eﬃciency
units is given by ε
l
L.
Assume a ‘technical’ constant returns to scale production function
8
Q = α
0
(ε
n
N)
α
1
(ε
l
L)
α
2
M
α
3
K
α
4
(3.1)
where Q, L, M , and K represent output, land, material inputs (e.g., fertilizer
and seeds) and physical capital or, in per capita terms,
q =
Q
N
= α
0
ε
α
1
n
ε
α
2
l
l
α
2
m
α
3
k
α
4
(3.2)
where q, l, m, k are output, land, material inputs, and capital per farmer.
3.2. The farmer’s proﬁt function
In principle, farmers may work in diﬀerent institutional settings that vary from a
communal system to various forms of share-contracting and private competitive
markets. Let farm income received be given by
y = βp(q − d) (3.3)
where p is the price of the agricultural good at which output is sold and d is
a constant term that can be considered as the ﬁxed rent or lump-sum tax the
farmer has to deliver to the state for the right to use the property. Outside of
pure communal arrangements, the value β is the fraction of the additional revenue
generated that the farmer is allowed to keep, so that β can be considered as a
share-cropping contract between the landlord (the State) and the farmer. For
our purposes, the value βp also represents an average goods price including three
components deﬁned as
βp = (β
s
p
s
+ β
m
p
m
+ β
w
p
w
) (3.4)
8
This is consistent with the empirical literature on agricultural production functions for
twenty-two developing countries (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985) and China (Tang, 1980). The
speciﬁcation is conﬁrmed on panel data for Vietnam in section 4.1.
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where p
s
, p
m
and p
w
are the state price, the market-clearing price and the export
price respectively and β
s
, β
m
and β
w
are the fractions or shares of agricultural
output, that sum to one, allocated or delivered to the state, the domestic market
or sold internationally. Diﬀerent regimes imply diﬀerent values for βp. Under
the communal system, the farmer was required to sell the entire agricultural out-
put to the State at a low state controlled price, implying that β
s
= 1. In the
output-contracts stage of reform, domestic markets existed but were still tightly
controlled, with the farmer still required to sell the major share of output to the
State at the low compulsory price, with the remainder to be sold on the domestic
market at a higher domestic market price. No trade in international markets
was allowed and arbitrage between state and domestic markets was rigorously
enforced. With the period of trade liberalization, the state market was eﬀectively
abolished, controls were largely removed from the domestic market and inter-
national trade was permitted. Rice output was allocated between domestic and
world markets at higher prices, with the diﬀerential between domestic market
prices and the world export price p
w
becoming increasingly smaller.
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Assume the farmer chooses inputs in order to minimize costs. With constant
returns to scale, minimizing costs subject to equation (3.1) gives a total cost (TC)
function
TC = c
0
∏
i
w
α
i
i
Q (3.5)
where α
i
are the share parameters in the technical production function, c
0
is a
constant deﬁned by
c
0
= α
−1
0
α
−α
1
1
α
−α
2
2
α
−α
3
3
α
−α
4
4
(3.6)
and w
i
are input prices indexed across eﬀective labour, eﬀective land, material
inputs and capital. Deﬁne W (w) ≡
∏
i
w
α
i
i
as the average (real) factor price, so
that the cost function per farmer (C) can be given as
C = c
0
W (w)q. (3.7)
During the process of market reform, factor markets in Vietnamese agriculture
changed considerably in terms of both their structure and their speed of develop-
ment. In the earlier stages, some types of inputs were ‘free’ (such as the labour
of the farmer), or unpaid, receiving only implicit or in-kind payments. With
market reform such payments became explicit and it is necessary to take into
account any resulting increases in input costs. In addition, more importantly, in
Vietnam, as is the case in many transitional economies, factor and product prices
generally increase at diﬀerent rates with market reform, with changes in factor
prices lagging behind the increase in product prices. To capture these eﬀects,
9
Since Vietnam is a natural exporter of agricultural goods, its export price will exceed its
domestic market price under autarky with free internal trade, which in turn will exceed its
domestic price under tightly regulated domestic markets. All prices are higher than the state-
controlled price.
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deﬁne ω ≡W (w)/βp as a weighted-cost share parameter or the ratio of observed
average factor to product prices. The farmer’s proﬁt function (π) thus becomes
π = βp(q − d)− c
0
W (w)q = βp [q(1− c
0
ω)− d] (3.8)
using equations (3.3) and (3.7) and the deﬁnition of ω.
3.3. Optimal behavior and the institutional production function
Following McMillan, Whalley and Zhu (1989), assume the farmer receives utility
from income but dislikes the eﬀort of hard work and of planning for more eﬃcient
use of land, so that
U(π, ε
n
, ε
l
) = π −
ε
z
n
zδ
−
ε
z
l
zδ
(3.9)
where δ > 0 and z > 1 are constants, so that marginal disutility of eﬀort increases
with eﬀort. The eﬀort-disutility coeﬃcient z is analogous to the coeﬃcient of risk
aversion and δ is chosen to guarantee that the utility function is jointly concave.
It is assumed that z is that same across eﬀort variables for labour and land,
although this clearly could be generalized. Substituting from equations (3.2) and
(3.8) gives
U(π, ε
n
, ε
l
) = βp
[
α
0
ε
α
1
n
ε
α
2
l
l
α
2
m
α
3
k
α
4
(1− c
0
ω)− d
]
−
ε
z
n
zδ
−
ε
z
l
zδ
. (3.10)
Consider the farmer’s optimal choice of eﬀort levels. Maximizing (3.10) with
respect to ε
n
and ε
l
implies that optimal values for labour and land eﬀort must
satisfy
ε
∗
n
=
(
δβp(1− c
0
ω)α
0
l
α
2
m
α
3
k
α
4
α
(z−α
2
)/z
1
α
α
2
/z
2
)
1/ν
(3.11)
and
ε
∗
l
=
(
δβp(1− c
0
ω)α
0
l
α
2
m
α
3
k
α
4
α
(z−α
1
)/z
2
α
α
1
/z
1
)
1/ν
(3.12)
for ν = (z − α
1
− α
2
). Finally, substituting equations (3.11) and (3.12) into the
per capita technical production function, or (3.2), and multiplying both sides by
N, gives the following ‘institutional’ production function
Q = AN
γ
1
L
γ
2
M
γ
3
K
γ
4
(3.13)
where the total factor productivity coeﬃcient A is given by
A = α
z/ν
0
δβp(1− c
0
ω)
(α
1
+α
2
)/ν
α
α
1
/ν
1
α
α
2
/ν
2
(3.14)
and share parameters are
γ
1
= (zα
1
− α
1
− α
2
)/ν γ
2
= zα
2
/ν γ
3
= zα
3
/ν (3.15)
and
γ
4
= zα
4
/ν (3.16)
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for labour, land, material inputs and capital respectively.
The institutional production function captures the farmer’s response to in-
stitutional arrangements and government policies, through changes in eﬀective
prices βp and the average ratio of input to product prices ω. It is equation (3.13)
rather than (3.1) that would be estimated using observable input and output
data. In this equation total factor productivity (A) and the optimal choice of
eﬀort depend both on the price level p, eﬀective product prices βp and the ratio
of average input to eﬀective output prices ω, variables which clearly diﬀer from
one stage of market reform to the next.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Estimation of the institutional rice production function
Estimates of equation (3.13) are based on a panel data set for rice growing areas
for the years 1991 to 1994, covering most of the main second stage of reforms or
the period of trade liberalization. These are the only years in which complete
cross-section data is currently available for 60 provinces (excluding the ‘special
petroleum economic zone’ or Baria-Vung Tau) in Vietnam.
10
Estimates are ob-
tained from a general log-linear speciﬁcation of the form
y
it
= α+ βx
it
+ v
i
+ ε
it
(4.1)
for x
it
a vector of inputs, v
i
an (unobserved) province-speciﬁc residual and ε
it
∼
N(0, σ
2
ε
) as usual. All results are reported in table 2. A Breusch and Pagan (1980)
test rejects the null hypothesis that the variance in the province-speciﬁc variable
(σ
2
v
) is zero and a Hausman (1978) test fails to reject the null that province-
speciﬁc errors are uncorrelated with the regressors, thus conﬁrming the choice of
a ‘random eﬀects’ model (e.g., Greene, 1993) given by
y
it
− ρy¯
i
= (1− ρ)α+ (x
it
− ρx¯
i
)β + (1− ρ)v
i
+ ε
it
− ρε¯
i
) (4.2)
for
ρ = 1−
[
σ
2
ε
/(σ
2
ε
+ Tσ
2
v
)
]
1/2
(4.3)
and time periods T. The estimated value of ρ is 0.1878 indicating that the random
eﬀects estimates are closer to pooled OLS rather than ﬁxed eﬀects estimates.
11
Share coeﬃcients for each γ or labour, land, material inputs and capital are 0.17,
0.27, 0.47 and 0.12 respectively.
12
A Wald test indicates that the hypothesis of
10
See appendix A for complete data sources and descriptions.
11
In trial speciﬁcations year-dummies and a deterministic time trend tested as insigniﬁcant.
Results are available from the authors on request.
12
It is important to note that the calculated values (see section 5) of the share coeﬃcients
α
i
in the technical production function, which directly correspond to the estimates of each γ
i
,
are roughly the same as the estimates for agricultural production obtained by Tang (1980) for
China and for twenty-two other developing countries provided by Hayami and Ruttan (1985).
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constant returns to scale could not be rejected at the 5 per cent level of signiﬁ-
cance. The relatively high coeﬃcient on material inputs is fully consistent with
the results of research by the United Nations Development Program and the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1980) showing that expenditure on chemical
fertilizer in particular is the major cost component faced by farmers, at roughly
65 per cent of total variable cost (Nguyen Khiem, 1991). In Vietnam, fertilizer is
the largest component of material inputs by far.
4.2. Total factor productivity with market reform
This section uses the market reform augmented share parameters from the above
estimates of the institutional production function to derive estimates of total
factor growth calculated as a Solow residual for each of the years 1981-94. This
is done using aggregate] data for output and inputs summarized in table 3 for
Vietnam as a whole and the north and south of Vietnam respectively for the years
1976-94. The annual growth rate for total factor productivity (A) is calculated
in the usual ‘growth accounting’ manner as the diﬀerence between the growth of
output and the growth of each input weighted by share parameters. The resulting
estimates of the year-by-year growth rates for A are then used to calculate an
index for TFP using the average of the years 1976-80 in the communal period
as the base. These ﬁgures are summarized in table 4. Average ﬁtted annual
growth rates are also given for the communal regime (1976-80) and for each of
the two main reform stages: output contracts (1981-87) and trade liberalization
(1988-94).
The results are revealing. Under the communal regime, TFP growth was
low for the country as a whole (0.77 per cent per annum) and was signiﬁcantly
negative for the north (a fall of 2.36 per cent per annum). On the other hand,
even under the communal regime, the south managed an annual rate of TFP
growth of 2.28 per cent. In addition, TFP in the south responded much more
rapidly than the north to the earlier reforms, achieving an annual growth rate of
TFP in the years 1981-87 of 4.77 per cent. In contrast, the north achieved a TFP
growth of less than 2 per cent per annum in this period. Interestingly, the south’s
annual rate of TFP growth tapered oﬀ in the second stage of reform, whereas
that of the north increased to over 3 per cent per annum.
This seems to suggest that in the south, where the push for trade liberalization
was more determined and the experience of market institutions was more recent,
farmers were able to adapt and seize opportunities much more quickly when the
ﬁrst reforms arrived. Thus, much of the TFP growth in the south was achieved
early, whereas it was not until the later market liberalization stage that the north
was able to achieve a reasonable level of TFP growth. This is not to suggest that
the growth of rice output slowed down in the south during the second stage of
reform, just that the main gains in TFP were achieved early. In fact, as shown
in table 1, the latter stage of reform in the south was still marked by a dramatic
10
increase in rice output, at a growth rate of 6.55 per cent.
It is usual in studies of this kind to attempt to explain the sources of TFP
growth. However, in the case of Vietnam this is diﬃcult. In particular, there
are no reliable ﬁgures for human capital and the extent of technological change,
potentially large factors in productivity improvement. However, we are able to
directly estimate the incentive component of TFP and its relative contribution
to growth since the beginning of the reform process. While this may be a poor
substitute for direct observation of human capital accumulation and the use of new
technical methods to produce rice, it does provide us with an estimable measure
of productivity change that can be directly related to policy, or market reform,
through changes in the ‘institutional’ parameters βp and (1− c
0
ω). Accordingly,
we now consider the relative importance of these incentive eﬀects in Vietnamese
TFP growth for rice.
5. The Contribution of Incentive Eﬀects
In this section the institutional production function estimated in section 4.1 is
used to decompose TFP (A), given equation (3.14), into two components; the
ﬁrst attributable to incentive eﬀects as captured in the eﬀort variables, or
A
1
= [βp(1− c
0
ω)]
(α
1
+α
2
)/ν
(5.1)
and the second
A
0
=
(
δ
α
1
+α
2
α
z
0
α
α
1
1
α
α
2
2
)
1/ν
(5.2)
as an ‘unexplained residual’ reﬂecting the inﬂuence of a host of other factors,
where A
1
· A
0
= A. While z, δ, α
1
and α
2
are all known (or can be calculated)
and are assumed to be time invariant, α
0
will change over time. With the available
data set, its time path cannot be estimated and thus we cannot directly estimate
the time path of A
0
. However, the time path of A has already been estimated as
a Solow residual (section 4.2) and we have time series data for the ‘institutional
variables’ βp and c
0
ω (table 5) so that a time path for the incentive component
of TFP or A
1
can be estimated. Appendix B calculates the value of z = 3
(with sensitivity results noted below) and the share coeﬃcients in the technical
production function, which are α
1
= 0.32 for labour, α
2
= 0.22 for land, α
3
= 0.39
for material inputs and α
4
= 0.10 for capital.
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The value of c
0
in equation (3.7)
is 1.4 and the exponential term in equation (5.1) is 0.22. Data sources and the
method for constructing the time series for the average rice price βp and ω are
given in appendix A.
13
As mentioned, given the relative importance of fertilizer in rice production, the share para-
meters for Vietnam do not diﬀer much from the estimates for agricultural production obtained
by Tang (1980) for China (0.50 for labour, 0.25 for land, 0.15 for material inputs and 0.10 for
capital) and for twenty-two other developing countries (respectively, 0.53, 0.10, 0.16 and 0.21)
reported by Hayami and Ruttan (1985). The diﬀerence in the estimates for labour in Vietnam
may be explained by the use of labour work days rather than (the unavailable) work hours.
11
Using all information, the resulting series for A
1
is given in table 5 (indexed
to the communal period, 1976-80 = 100). The proportional growth rate of A
1
is
˙
A
1
A
1
=
(
α
1
+ α
2
z − α
1
− α
2
)


·
(βp)
βp
+
(
·
1− c
0
ω)
1− c
0
ω


(5.3)
and table 5 makes it clear that output prices increased much more quickly than
input prices.
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Table 5 also replicates the index of TFP or A given in table 4
and calculates the proportion of cumulative TFP growth relative to the commu-
nal regime (1976-80) accounted for by the incentive component. This proportion
changes considerably from year to year, however it is clear from table 5 that, on
average, the incentive component of growth is a larger proportion of overall TFP
growth in the second stage of reform (trade liberalization, 1988-94) than in the
earlier stage (the output-contracts stage, 1981-87). This higher relative contribu-
tion of the incentive eﬀect to overall TFP growth in the later years of reform is
observed for Vietnam as a whole and for the north and the south respectively.
15
It is also notable that the annual rate of increase of A
1
is uniformly higher for
the second stage of reform than the ﬁrst (increasing from 0.94 to 2.86 per cent
per annum for the country as a whole).
The relationship between the incentive component of TFP and total TFP is
illustrated for Vietnam as a whole in ﬁgures 1 and 2, which graphs the time paths
of the indices of A (TFP) and A
1
(the incentive component) and the proportion
of A
1
to A respectively. The diagrams are not intended to show any absolute
relationship between A and A
1
because both indices are set equal to 100 in the
initial period (the communal regime). Rather, the graphs illustrate the cumula-
tive growth of the incentive component relative to the cumulative growth of TFP.
The bold vertical line in the middle of both ﬁgures marks the switch from the
output-contracts to the trade liberalization regime in 1987. The transition to a
more extensive market reform regime is thus seen to result in a rapid increase
in both TFP and the incentive component of TFP. Moreover, after 1987, cumu-
lative growth due to the incentive eﬀect rises steadily from just over one-third
of cumulative TFP growth in 1987 to three-ﬁfths of cumulative TFP growth in
1994.
14
With market reform the price of fertilizer actually fell in Vietnam from 1984 to 1994 (FAO,
1999).
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Sensitivity results on the eﬀort disutility coeﬃcient z = 3 imply small variations in the
growth rate of A
1
. For z = 2.8, the resulting growth rate of A
1
in Vietnam as a whole is 1.03
in the period of output contracts and 3.10 with trade liberalization. The comparable ﬁgures
for the north and south are 1.33, 2.47 and 0.83, 3.62 respectively. For z = 3.2, the resulting
growth rate in Vietnam as a whole is 0.86 in the period of output contracts and 2.66 with trade
liberalization. For the north and south the values are 1.12, 2.12 and 0.70, 3.11 respectively.
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6. Conclusion
This paper has focused on the eﬀects of the reforms which have occurred in Viet-
namese rice production since 1980. A simple model is used to consider optimizing
behavior by farmers based on an ‘institutional’ production function, which reﬂects
not only the usual technical relationship between inputs and outputs, but also
eﬀort responses to the institutional and market arrangements within which farm-
ers work. Assuming farmers choose their eﬀort levels optimally, it is possible to
estimate these ‘incentive eﬀects’ at each stage of reform and compare them with
the overall change in total factor productivity. Results show that this incentive
component represents a higher proportion of post-1980 total factor productivity
growth for the later trade liberalization stage of reform than for the earlier, more
reform-limited output contracts stage. We also observe an earlier response of
productivity to reform in the south than in the north, conceivably because of
the more recent experience of market institutions in the south. The overall re-
sults conﬁrm that the more extensive is market reform the larger the increase in
TFP and the share of TFP growth due to incentive eﬀects, suggesting that more
competitive markets and secure property rights matter greatly.
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Appendix A: Data sources and methods
Original data sources are drawn mainly from the General Statistics Oﬃce of
Vietnam (GSO) and the SDAFF (Statistics Department of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries), and related project investigations, studies and reports by Viet-
namese organizations, such as the State Planning Committee (SPC), the Min-
istry of Agriculture and Food Processing Industry (MAFI), the Ministry of Wa-
ter Resources (MWR), the State Department of Price (SDP), and international
organizations including the World Bank (WB) and the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO).
The panel data used for estimation of the institutional rice production func-
tion, equation (3.13), is cross-sectional for 60 provinces over the years 1991 to
1994 and is obtained from the National Investigation of Rural Regions (SDAFF,
2001 and GSO, 1995b). A rice equivalent for output is chosen rather than rice
output alone since in the same rice ﬁelds farmers usually overlap production with
other short-term cereal crops, such as sweet potatoes and maize. Time series data
for rice output is from SDAFF (1991) and MAFI (1991) for the period 1976-90,
from SDAFF (1995a) for 1990-93 and from GSO (1995) for 1994.
Labor is measured as person-days and is obtained by multiplying average
person-days per hectare in agriculture (SRF, various issues) by the rice cultivated
area (SDAFF (1991, 1994, 1995b), MAFI (1991), GSO (1995)). The data for
rice as sown area is drawn from the National Investigation of Rural Regions in
Vietnam, reported by the GSO (1994).
The land input is measured as the sown area of rice, obtained from SDAFF
(1991, 1995a), MAFI (1991) and GSO (1995). Capital inputs are obtained as a
weighted sum of draught animals (SDAFF (1992, 1995a), MAFI (1991) and GSO
(1995)) and tractors (SDAFF, 1996). The conversion from the number of draught
animals to tractor capacity is based on (Blomqvist, 1986) and assumes that a
bullock-day (a pair of bullock working 8 hours) is approximately the same as a
tractor-hour at 15 to 25 horsepower. Total capital input for rice production is then
derived as the total capital input for cultivation multiplied by the proportional
share of rice cultivated area to the total cultivated area of agriculture.
Material inputs include the nutrition content of all fertilizers (organic and
chemical), insecticides and seeds (Tang, 1980, Sicular, 1988). The conversion
factor used to aggregate organic and chemical fertilizers is similar to that used
by Tang (1980:61). Because green manure data is not available, organic fertilizer
data is obtained by aggregating estimates of night soil (based on rural population
data) and large animal manure (buﬀaloes, cattle and pigs) from SDAFF (1992,
1995a), MAFI (1991) and GSO (1995). Population-adjusted night-soil equals the
rural population (GSO, 1995) multiplied by a rural utilization rate (0.9). The
standard number of large animals equals the sum of buﬀaloes, cattle and pigs
(GSO, 1994) for which the weighted ratios are 1, 1 and 0.33 respectively.
The time series for chemical fertilizers is calculated from the average amounts
of chemical fertilizer used per hectare (SRF, 1996) multiplied by cultivated area
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in each year (SDAFF, 1996). The series data for insecticides and seeds are cal-
culated from the average use of insecticide and seeds per hectare (SDAFF, 1996)
multiplied by rice area for each year. The derived data are consistent with a study
done by the World Bank (1994). A ﬁgure for total material inputs is obtained by
aggregating fertilizer, insecticide and seeds using the weights in Sicular (1988)
The value of β, equation (3.4), in the output contracts stage of reform is set
at a market share of 0.8, 0.2 and zero for the state, domestic and international
market. This is average data computed from the GSO, 1994 years) in which
the market share is 0.88, 0.12 (in 1985), 0.82, 0.18 (in 1986) and 0.82, 0.18 (in
1987) for state and domestic markets for grains. Research by the State Planning
Committee in 1995 also used the rate 0.8, 0.2 to adjust the multiple prices for
grain at this time. In the stage of trade liberalization, the share of output sold
to the state was clearly zero, with the share between domestic and international
markets was obtained from average GSO data from 1988-94.
Time series data for nominal rice prices for 1976-94 was obtained from the
State Department of Price (SDP, 1995). These prices are multiplied by the ap-
propriate values of β as in equation (3.4) to obtain an average nominal rice price.
To convert this to an average real price, it would normally be usual to deﬂate by
the consumer price index. However, in the case of Vietnam, such price indices are
highly volatile and unreliable due largely to poor and erratic construction meth-
ods (see Che, 1997:190-203). Under the circumstances, a more reliable measure
of the underlying rate of inﬂation is the Dong/U.S. dollar exchange rate which is
used here as the deﬂator for βp. This is in line with the high correlation between
the Vietnamese inﬂation rate and the ratio Dong/$US noted by the World Bank
(1994:67-68) and is a measure commonly used by the Vietnamese (especially so
during periods of high inﬂation). Following the practice of the State Department
of Price (SDP), the nominal rice price in Nam Dinh and Can Tho is taken to
represent the rice price in the north and south respectively.
Input prices in equation (3.7), used to construct the weighted-cost share para-
meter ω, are measured in rice units or, for example, how many tons of rice farmers
have to pay to get one ton of urea, to employ one thousand labour work-days, or
to rent one hectare of land. Details are contained in Che (1997). Many oﬃcial
data sources for input expenditures are already measured in terms of rice units
as a matter of practice. The time-series data for the relative price of urea to rice
are drawn from the Central Price Committee (CPC), as reported in Nguyen Hien
(1991) and Nguyen Khiem (1995).
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Appendix B: Calculation of the eﬀort-disutility coeﬃcient and share
parameters in the technical production function
Given the relationship that exists between the share parameters in the tech-
nical and institutional production function, equations (3.15) and (3.16), it is
straightforward to calculate the estimated values of α
i
from the values of γ
i
and the work-disutility coeﬃcient z. Following McMillan, Whalley and Zhu
(1989:793), the eﬀort disutility coeﬃcient, although unobservable, can be derived
directly from equation (3.14) with a knowledge of βp. To simplify, calculate z
from the approximate growth rate of A in two contiguous years during the com-
munal system and within a given reform period, where the average weighted-cost
share parameter ω and β are the same. The years 1978-79 and 1982-83 roughly
correspond. Using values for βp from table 5, and given the estimated value of
the proportional growth in total factor productivity from section 4.2 , z can be
shown to range from 2.8 to 3.2. A value of z = 3 is chosen for all calculations. The
approximate values of the share parameters in the technical production function
(solving simultaneously) are thus α
1
= 0.32 α
2
= 0.22, α
3
= 0.39 and α
4
= 0.10
for labour, land, material inputs and capital respectively. Given equation (3.6)
the value of c
0
is thus 3.65. It is worth noting that writing the cost function in
terms of institutional parameters γ results only in a slight change in c
0
to 3.52.
16
References
Blomqvist, A. 1986, ‘The village and beyond: market and public policy (1)’
in Scarp Marden Evaluation Baseline Study, J. Freedman, ed., Canadian Inter-
national Development Agency, Ottawa.
Breusch, T. and Pagan, A. 1980, “The LM test and its applications to model
speciﬁcation in econometrics”, Review of Economic Studies, 47, 239—254.
Che, T. N. 1997, The Eﬀects of Internal and External Trade Liberalisation on
Agricultural Growth: A Case Study of Vietnam, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Australian National University, Canberra.
Che, T. N., Kompas, T. and Vousden, N. 2001, ‘Incentives and static and
dynamic gains from market reform’, The Australian Journal of Agricultural and
Resource Economics, 45, 547—572.
Chu. V. Lam, Nguyen, T. Nguyen, Phung, H. Phu, Tran, Q. Toan and Dang,
T. Xuong 1992, ‘Agricultural cooperatives in Vietnam, history, problems and
prospective’, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi.
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) 1999, Yearbook, Fertiliser, 49,
Rome.
Fforde, Adam and de Vylder, Stefan 1988, Vietnam: An Economy in Transi-
tion, Swedish International Development Authority, Stockholm..
Fforde, Adam 1996, ‘The institutions of transition from central planning: the
case of Vietnam’ in Institutions and Economic Change in Southeast Asia, Colin
Barlow, ed., Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.
Greene, W. H. 1993, Econometric Analysis, 3rd ed., Prentice-Hall, New Jersey.
GSO (General Statistics Oﬃce) 1995, Statistical Yearbook 1975—94, Statistical
Publishing House, Hanoi.
GSO (General Statistics Oﬃce) 2001, Statistical Data of Vietnam Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries 1975-2000, Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi.
Hausman, J. 1978, “Speciﬁcation tests in econometrics,” Econometrica, 46,
1251—1271.
Hayami, Y. and Ruttan, V. W. 1985, Agricultural Development: An Interna-
tional Perspective, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
MAFI (Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industries) 1991, ‘A report on mech-
anization in agriculture, 1986-90 and the strategy for the next ﬁve years’, unpub-
lished, Hanoi.
MAFI 1995, Annual Reports 1975—94, unpublished, Hanoi.
McMillan, J., Whalley, J. and Zhu, L. 1989, “The impact of China’s economic
reforms on agricultural productivity growth”, Journal of Political Economy, 97,
781—807.
Nguyen, T. Hien 1995, ‘Vietnam: agricultural policy reforms and microeco-
nomic environment’, paper presented at the Vietnam Update conference, Novem-
ber, unpublished, Canberra.
Nguyen, T. Khiem 1991, ‘Vietnam’s policy on the price of materials in agricul-
ture’, paper presented at the workshop ‘Policies for the development of agriculture
17
in Vietnam’ by the State Planning Committee and the FAO, August, unpublished,
Hanoi.
Pingali, Prabhu L. and Xuan, Vo-Tong 1992, “Vietnam: decollectivization
and rice productivity growth”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 40,
697-718.
SDAFF (Statistics Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) 1991,
‘Statistical data for agriculture, forestry and ﬁsheries in Vietnam, 1956—90’, Sta-
tistical Publishing House, Hanoi.
SDAFF 1991, ‘Statistical data for agriculture, forestry and ﬁsheries in Viet-
nam, 1956—90’, Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi.
SDAFF 1992, ‘Statistical data for agriculture, forestry and ﬁsheries in Viet-
nam, 1976—91’, Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi.
SDAFF 1995a, ‘Data collection for the rice industry’, unpublished, Hanoi.
SDAFF 1995b, ‘Statistical data on the basic situation and infrastructure of
rural regions in Vietnam’, Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi.
SDAFF 1996, ‘Data collection for the state of the rice industry’, unpublished,
Hanoi.
SDP (State Department of Price) 1995, Project 93—98—120/DT, ‘The market
and price for rice production in the market economy of Vietnam’, unpublished,
Hanoi.
Sicular, T. 1988, ‘Plan and market in China’s agricultural commerce’, Journal
of Political Economy, 96, 283—307.
SPC (State Planning Committee) 1995, ‘Principles of changing agricultural
structures in Vietnamese rural areas’, unpublished, Hanoi.
SRF (Statistics for Rice Farms) 1994, Annual Reports (1988—93), Cantho
University, unpublished, Cantho.
Summers, L. 1982, ‘Tax policy, the rate of return and savings’, NBER working
paper (#995), Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Tang, A. M. 1980, ‘Food and agriculture in China: trends and predictions’,
in Food Production in the People’s Republic of China, Tang, A. M. and Stone, B.
eds., Research Report #15, International Food Policy Research Institute, Wash-
ington, DC.
World Bank 1994, Vietnam: Toward the Market-Oriented Economy, The Na-
tional Political Publishing House, Hanoi.
18
 

	
 !"#



 $ %
  !"&' &"&  &&"#  !"#  !"&' &"&  &&"#  !"#  !"&' &"&  &&"#  !"#
(   	 	
   
   
 	

 
	
)  
  	      
  
)  
 
  	  	    
 

*
+
  

    

	 		   
	 
,   	    	 	   
 


	
			












	
























































 













	




































 









	






!"#





	






	





	

		



	




	

	
	
	


	
	



		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	




		






	



	
 
!
!
	




	



	

"




	



	


"
	




	
#

	


	

!




	


!
	


!
 
	




	
$


	


"



	


"
	
!


	




	
$




		



	


!
	

 
!
	


 

	
	
	
	
	
	
	

















	
!


"


#










	
	








	
%


&


	

'
 
	
	

'
!
	
	
%


&


	(

)

		

'
 
	
	

'
!
	
	





	
	
	


		



	
	


'
	
	
*



+


	
		



	
	

,

	
	
	
	
	
	
	




!

'

	
	
	
	



,



	
	
	
	
-


,

,
	
	
	
	
	
+

	
.
	&


	/!
0	-
	
'
!

,

								1


	2
	.
	&


	-
	



	
3


.
1



	
#
																						.
	&


	/
0	-
	'
,
"
																


	2
	.
	&

	-
	




	
4




																																					.
	&


	/
0	-
	5


																


	2
	.
	&

-
	
"

5
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
	




 
  	
	 	
	
 	
   	 	 	
   	 	 	
   	 	
    	     	     	 
               
 	
 
  	
  	
 
  	
  	
 
  	
 
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
 !"#               
$%&   '     '     '  

	
	
 !" #$	%&&'('&!)&*	+		



+,		-







	

























 



!
"



#

$
%
&

'&


(

&




&
)


&












	










	





















































	











	





	

























	




















































































	
































	














	























	










	

	















	







	





















	


















	



























	



	

















 










	
	

































	
	



































	













	


	




	








 
	















ω

	








  

	β
	












	

	β
	












	

	β













	
	
 
	  



 



  	 



 



  
 



 



 
	 
	 		 
 
	 
	 	
  

	 	 	 
	 
 



	 
	   
  	  
 		  
 
 	
	 
	 	 	
 
  
  
 	
 	 

 
 

	 
	 
  
	 	
   
 
   
	 
	 
	  	 

  

 
 
	 	 	  

 
	 
		 
  
	  	 

 
	 

 
 
 
	 	
	 
		 
  
	
 

  	 
	    
	 
		 

      	 		  


   
	 
 	  		  
 	 		 	 


   	

 
 
  	   
 	  	  	 
	
 
 	
    	


 
  
 	 		 	 

 
 	 
 
    
 
 
	 
  	

 

    
     	 	
	  
 
  
	    	   	 	 	 



 
		   




  
	


  





		   


	
  



	
  
	



	
	
β

	 !
	"
"!#$		


%
&	$%!




 





	


































 
!
"

!
!
#


























	

      
   
   
   	
   

   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   	
   






	














	

















$
	



%







&




'

#
&









'
#






















	


   
   
   	
   

   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   	
   















